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Iona HeathIntroduction
My title comes from Joseph Conrad who, in his 1913
novel Chance, wrote:
You know the power of words. We pass through
periods dominated by this or that word - it may be
development, or it may be competition, or education,
or purity or efficiency or even sanctity. It is the word
of the time. Well just then it was the word Thrift
which was out in the streets walking arm in arm with
righteousness, the inseparable companion and backer
up of all such national catch-words, looking everybody
in the eye as it were [1].
Today, the word is quality, out in the streets walking
arm in arm with righteousness, with all the self-
satisfaction that implies. The fundamental problem with
all such national catch-words is that they all too seldom
have real substance and all too often become slogans
used in the exercise of power.
The challenge is that there will never be authentic
quality within healthcare unless the word explicitly ac-
commodates the truth that a human being is simultan-
eously both a subject and an object. Within a consultation
both doctor and patient need to oscillate between perceiv-
ing the body as an object and as a subject. When the body
is perceived as an object, the gaze of biomedical science
sees only what the particular patient has in common with
other patients: the perspective is normative and mono-
logical. When the body is perceived as a subject, we see
what is unique about this person: their life context, its
story and the meanings that adhere to both. The perspec-
tive is dialogical and intersubjective involving two unique
subjects: the patient and the doctor. Issues of quality need
to be addressed within both of these perspectives. Yet, to
date, quality in relation to the human being as an object
has predominated because this is infinitely the easier
option as it is possible to create a normative standard
that is able to completely ignore the difficult issues of
subjectivity [2].Correspondence: iona.heath22@yahoo.co.uk
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Systems engineer Paul Plsek compares throwing a stone
with throwing a live bird. The trajectory of a stone can
be calculated precisely using the laws of mechanics, and
it is possible to ensure that the stone reaches a specified
target [3]. However, it is absolutely not possible to pre-
dict the outcome of throwing the live bird, even though,
in truth, the same laws of physics govern the bird’s mo-
tion through the air. As Plsek points out, one solution
would be to tie the bird’s wings, weight it with a rock
and then throw it. This will make its trajectory nearly as
predictable as that of the stone, but in the process the
capability of the bird is completely destroyed. This seems
very close to what happens when we try to measure the
quality of healthcare using measures that ignore the pres-
ence of human subjects either as patients or as healthcare
professionals.
The anthropologist Clifford Geertz touches on the same
contrast -
The contrast … is … between those who believe that
the task of the human sciences … is to discover facts,
set them into propositional structures, deduce laws,
predict outcomes, and rationally manage social life,
and those who believe that the aim of those sciences
… is to clarify what on earth is going on among
various people at various times and draw some
conclusions about constraints, causes, hopes, and
possibilities - the practicalities of life [4].
And he argues the need to hold these polarities in the
sort of constructive balance that seems so far to have
eluded us in the assessment of quality in healthcare.
The flight into scientism, or, on the other side, into
subjectivism, is but a sign that the tension cannot any
longer be borne, that nerve has failed and a choice
has been made to suppress one’s humanity or one’s
rationality. These are the pathologies of science, not
its norm.an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
rg/licenses/by/4.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
iginal work is properly credited. The Creative Commons Public Domain
g/publicdomain/zero/1.0/) applies to the data made available in this article,
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rationality at the expense of humanity [5].
The great German philosopher Hans Georg Gadamer
writes:
- the progress of technology encounters an unprepared
humanity. It vacillates between the extremes of an
affect-laden opposition to rational innovation and a no
less affect-laden craving to ‘rationalize’ all forms and
sectors of life, a development which more and more
acquires the form of a panic flight from freedom [6].
Today, much of the assessment of quality in healthcare
feels like this panic flight from freedom and we are more
and more subjected to ‘the tyranny of what can be mea-
sured’ [7]: the endless ticking of boxes and completion
of forms and entertaining of teams of inspection and
regulation [8].
Surveillance
Computers allow the processing of unprecedented amounts
of data and they are driving an obsession with measure-
ment and it is being used in a normative and coercive
way to define and demonise “deviant” behaviour whether
among doctors or patients.
Writing about the development and use of psycho-
logical tests, Tor-Johan Ekeland describes such measure-
ments as rendering:
- individuals into knowledge as objects of a
hierarchical and normative gaze. The individuality is
no longer unique and beyond knowledge, but can be
known, mapped, calibrated, evaluated, quantified,
predicted and managed. They become techniques for
the disciplining of human difference [9].
Biological variation has been appropriated to the causes
of commercial profit and of lifestyle and political conform-
ity, and normative quality assurance that focuses on the
body as an object is part of this. In an increasingly indi-
vidualistic and consumerist society, people are encouraged
to seek “the best” both now and in the future. Nothing
can be left to chance, every risk must be minimised and
the emphasis is on control. Physicians may not be driving
this but they are certainly colluding.
The culture of conformity pays lip service to auton-
omy and choice but it is clear that the individual is only
really free to make the choice which is approved by the
state [10]. It is assumed that once the “healthy choice” is
pointed out, everyone will select it and no account is
taken of the very differing circumstances and aspirations
of different people’s lives.
Across the whole of medicine, we are witnessing an
extraordinary process within which the definition ofdisease is shifting away from patients’ subjective experi-
ence of symptoms, distress and suffering and towards
the numbers of biometric measurement.
Longevity has become the preeminent outcome meas-
ure and the length of life has become more important
than how that life is lived. Yet, as critic Christopher Ricks
puts it, although -
Most people most of the time want to live forever. …
most people some of the time, and some people most
of the time, do not want to live forever [11].
In 1941 Rebecca West wrote -
- only a part of us is sane: only part of us loves
pleasure and the longer day of happiness, wants to
live to our nineties and die in peace, in a house that
we built, that shall shelter those that come after us.
The other half of us is nearly mad. It prefers the
disagreeable to the agreeable, loves pain and its darker
night despair, and wants to die in a catastrophe that
will set back life to its beginnings and leave nothing of
our house save its blackened foundations [12].
If medicine and health care systems, and their associ-
ated quality measures, can offer no understanding of this
other half, they will fail – drug dependence, alcoholism,
mental illness, suicide, violence and much ordinary illness
will elicit no response.
The contemporary marginalisation of the human
subject affects doctors and other healthcare professionals
almost as much as patients. Both have been reduced to
interchangeable units within a healthcare industry: the
one as a unit of healthcare need, the other of healthcare
provision. And, as patients have been reduced to these
interchangeable units of health need, their access to the
system has been systematically prioritised over the need
to sustain a relationship with a known and trusted pro-
fessional, with another human subject.
Quality and outcomes framework
In UK general practice, the Quality and Outcomes
Framework has exemplified the growing ascendancy of
the body as object over the body as subject. It has pro-
voked reactions ranging from enthusiasm to dismay but
because of the substantial financial incentive the points
have been collected assiduously. The stated ambition is
that the quality criteria should be evidence based but
most evidence is derived from the study of highly se-
lected populations with a single condition and from only
a segment of the age range. Nonetheless, the QOF cri-
teria are applied across the whole age range and to those
with complex co-morbidity thereby extrapolating the
evidence well beyond its initial range. This systematic
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cultural and economic context should be a serious cause
for concern. To date, the vast majority of the clinical
measures have been of process rather than of outcomes
relevant to patients and a disturbingly large number of
the measures assess the adherence to pharmaceutical
treatments.
The QOF purports to measure clinical quality at the
level of the individual, or rather at the level of a standar-
dised normative individual of its own creation, and
organisational quality at the level of the primary care
practice. Take the case of a single patient with hyperten-
sion. However, she also has bronchiectasis after many
years of smoking. She has just been diagnosed with can-
cer of the oesophagus. She has a child with severe learn-
ing difficulties and she is fearful, not only for herself but
also about what will happen to her child. She is married
and the relationship is difficult. Her sister has lung can-
cer and is already very ill. The sister’s children have
problems and children of their own and this is only the
beginning of a story which becomes richer and richer
the more it is told. It is a story with multiple compo-
nents each of which interacts with the others unpredict-
ably. Each of the components has a history which affects
the interaction and each has the capacity to affect the
patient’s blood pressure and to support or undermine
the treatment that is prescribed for her. To what extent
does the achievement of a blood pressure of less than
150/90 assess the quality of this patient’s care?
Don Berwick – perceptive as ever, notes:
Individuals involved in day-to-day improvement work
fear that if “evidence” is too narrowly defined and the
approach to gathering evidence too severely con-
strained, progress may be the victim [13].
The messy reality of primary care is that most patients
have multiple, interacting and compounding problems –
physical, psychological and social. However, most scientific
evidence upon which disease-specific quality measures are
based, explicitly excludes people with co-morbid condi-
tions. When such patients are seen by a number of spe-
cialist physicians, each of which has expertise in a single
condition, the sum of the advice can be both conflicting
and excessively burdensome to the patient. The whole
patient is more than the sum of the parts. The key tasks of
primary health care are the integration of care so that it
becomes both possible and coherent, personalising care to
the particular circumstances and capacities of the individ-
ual patient, explicitly acknowledging the human subject,
and prioritising the various problems so that the burden
on the patient is minimised [14]. We have no metric for
measuring these qualities. And if we could create one,
would it make the task any easier [15]?In contemporary healthcare, numbers have, to a very
large extent, taken the place of words; yet, description is
so much more capacious than measurement. Perhaps we
should be assessing quality much more through story
and description and much less through number and
reductive processes of measurement. The problem, of
course, is that the assessment of words necessarily in-
volves human judgment and cannot be done by a com-
puter. Yet this is perhaps the one attribute of words that
make them so peculiarly appropriate for judging quality
within healthcare.
The predicament of professionals
As austerity and socioeconomic polarisation make more
and more people sick, and as the quality machine de-
mands more and more reporting, the pressure on gen-
eral practitioners and other healthcare professionals is
becoming intense. And there is no time for reflection
and learning, no time for improvement, more failure,
and so, yet more inspection and regulation is imposed:
this particular vicious circle has become very familiar
and seems to be wound tighter every week.
Clinical medicine provides the arena within which the
subjective experience of illness and suffering is brought
into contact with the classifications of biomedical sci-
ence. The evidence on which biomedical science is based
has been derived from the analysis of data from popula-
tions grouped together by what they have in common:
difference is systematically excluded or ignored. Huge
advances in understanding and efficacy have been made
through these techniques. The ineradicable problem is
that data collected from populations can tell us nothing
about what will happen to any particular individual. The
application of biomedical evidence to the care of an in-
dividual will always require the exercise of judgment on
the part of both clinician and patient. What is the appro-
priate label to use for this person in this particular situ-
ation and which treatment is both acceptable and the
most likely to help rather than harm? In primary health
care, these judgments are often made in the context of
an ongoing relationship between patient and clinician
and the nature of the relationship can affect the out-
come for either good or ill. Hence, the quality of primary
healthcare is crucially dependent on two phenomena,
judgment and human relationships, and for neither of
which is there any recognised metric of assessment.
In 1956, the writer George Ewart Evans published his
masterpiece of oral history which he called ‘Ask the
Fellows who Cut the Hay’ [16]. It would be more than
timely if those in power in this country could be per-
suaded to reflect on this title. There is a pervasive and
disturbing lack of knowledge of the daily experience of
working at the frontline of public service, let alone any
valuing of or respect for that experience. This applies to
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doctors and many more. It is undoubtedly true for those
working in general practice and primary care which is
particularly sad as we see, every day, the effects of struc-
tural violence and social injustice working themselves
out in premature illness and disease and in blighted and
shortened lives.
The fellows who cut they hay in the health service
would, I think, agree with Annmarie Mol -
Our theoretical frameworks seem to be too
exclusively adapted to the task of ‘criticism’. They
unmask. They tend not to explore or build ideals but
to undermine them [17].
Conclusion
In his essay on Virgil published in 1944, TS Eliot wrote
In our age, when men seem more than ever prone to
confuse wisdom with knowledge, and knowledge with
information, and to try to solve problems of life in
terms of engineering, there is coming into existence a
new kind of provincialism which perhaps deserves a
new name. It is a provincialism, not of space, but of
time; one for which history is merely the chronicle of
human devices which have served their turn and been
scrapped, one for which the world is the property
solely of the living, a property in which the dead hold
no shares [18].
This underlines the disturbing tendency within
medicine to live outside history: to mock the mistakes
of previous generations while assuming the enduring
rightness of our own priorities and procedures. Mod-
ern quality machinery involves insufficient doubt and
it has become difficult to question the means because
the end of ‘quality’ is so obviously worthy. Nonethe-
less, many of the means are damaging not least be-
cause they are so unidimensional and propagate an
intensely normative and objectifying view of what it
means to be healthy and of what human life and
healthcare should be [19].
I accept that, as in the consultation, when we try to as-
sess the quality of health care we need to hold in balance
the object and the subject. The problem is that the ob-
ject side of the balance is so much easier to assess that it
tends to overwhelm the subject – and the human subject
is in so many aspects unknowable that attempts to
bolster the subjective assessment of quality may prove
destructive of aspects of practice which, at their best, are
ephemeral, ineffable and unmeasurable.
So let me finish by going back to Conrad: what would
the world look like if we went back to thrift and put
thrift back arm in arm with righteousness? It would lookvery very different and perhaps be none the worse for
that.
We would at least have revitalised
- an acute sense of waste as a moral and political
issue [20].
At the moment we waste effort, money and time, col-
lecting data and pursuing quality targets, so that we have
less time to listen and we risk losing sight of the suffer-
ing human subject. And we risk destroying quality in
our attempt to measure it. It is time to untie Plsek’s
birds.
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